Japan and Australia Draw Closer Amid Indo-Pacific Threats

The importance of the new Framework for Strategic Defence Coordination (FSDC) signed in December, aiming to elevate the 'Special Strategic Partnership' between Australia and Japan, was proven almost immediately.

During Defence Minister Richard Marles' visit to his Japanese counterpart, Shinjirō Koizumi, Chinese fighter jets from the carrier Liaoning locked on to Japanese aircraft conducting routine counter-surveillance measures near the sovereign Japanese territory of Okinawa.

The move represented a serious escalation and underscored the importance of this new defence partnership between two like-minded allies which have a shared vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). This vision, developed by Tokyo almost a decade ago, is of paramount importance in the current geopolitical environment.

Japan's partners flocked to share their support in the aftermath, emphasising the threat posed by such destabilising acts to the rules-based international order. Marles immediately expressed his deep concern before declaring that 'Australia remains with Japan.'

The timing reinforced precisely why the Australia–Japan relationship, and this new framework, matter so much.

The FSDC will be led directly by the two countries defence ministers and supported by regular meetings among officials. It will expand consultation on defence policy, intelligence, bilateral and multilateral activities, and industrial cooperation, as well as capabilities in space, cyber and integrated air and missile defence.

Defence Ministers Koizumi and Marles underlined that it will ensure the two countries can work together 'at all levels' and in all situations.

Japan and Australia's deepening strategic convergence and commitment to defence comes as a response to the growing threat to the status quo in the region.

Chief among these threats is China's expanding assertiveness, which has manifested itself across multiple theatres; from the construction and militarisation of artificial features in the South China Sea to incursions around the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea and the most recent lock-on incident.

These actions have created a sense of strategic urgency felt keenly by the two nations, which was evident when, in August, Australia selected Japan to build eleven advanced Mogami-class frigates.

During his trip to Japan, Marles visited Mitsubishi Heavy Industries' Nagasaki shipyard where the first three new frigates for Australia are being constructed.

The deal marks Japan's most significant defence export project to date and one which advances defence industrial cooperation between the two allies.

The upgraded Mogami-class frigates also represent a substantial leap forward for the Royal Australian Navy. Compared to the Anzac-class frigates, they require smaller crews, boast a much greater range and are fitted with surface-to-air missiles and anti-ship missiles.

Crucially, the frigates are well-suited to the denial strategy adopted by both Australia and Japan. This strategy aims to address threats more quickly and farther away, in collaboration with regional partners. The procurement of the ships also signals a key shift: Japan and Australia are transitioning from basic interoperability to the development of integrated capabilities.

For Tokyo, this is driven by external factors, but also internal change. Sanae Takaichi, who became Japan's Prime Minister in October last year, has been explicit about the threat that China poses. She has urged closer ties with like-minded partners such as Australia and highlighted the need for Tokyo to enhance its own defence capabilities to counter Beijing.

For his part, Minister Koizumi stressed that Tokyo recognises the regional security environment is at its most severe since World War Two. His willingness to bring forward the revision of the three key national security strategic documents is likely a response to this.

Koizumi has also signalled the need to relax longstanding restrictions that limit Japan's defence exports to five non-combat categories.

This shift is taking place alongside this year's record budget, which includes expenditures related to the introduction of standoff capabilities and unmanned assets, as well as a greater openness to hosting cooperative defence projects.

For Canberra, Japan's willingness to assume a larger regional role provides reassurance at a time of growing strategic unease. It also offers significant practical opportunities for collaboration.

Strong Japan–Australia cooperation enhances the wider network of Indo-Pacific partnerships, a point that was emphasised at the Land Forces Summit last year, which included the participation of the Australian Army. This is because multilateral arrangements are strongest when underpinned by robust bilateral partnerships.

For example, Japan's growing involvement in AUKUS lends the pact broader regional credibility, adding a major Asian power.

Within the Quad, Australia and Japan are often the most active members behind the United States, shaping initiatives on maritime security, technology and regional resilience.

Ultimately, preserving a free and open Indo-Pacific depends on credible, significant capabilities and strong partnerships. Diplomatic statements simply aren't enough to deter against the threats the region faces.

Neither Australia nor Japan seeks confrontation with China. Following a Japan-China Summit meeting last October between Prime Minister Takaichi and President Xi Jinping, Defence Minister Koizumi stressed that alongside Beijing, Tokyo seeks to build 'constructive and stable Japan-China relations.'

But such engagement can only occur safely if backed by strong deterrence. That is why the Japan–Australia relationship is so important.

As threats and risks grow, deeper cooperation between Tokyo and Canberra is essential to maintaining stability and ensuring that the Indo-Pacific remains free, open and secure.