When Absence of Evidence is Not Enough: How Regulators Assess
When Absence of Evidence is Not Enough: How Regulators Assess the Risk of Interference in the Press

Mark Mortelli -IMI's objections to the Ofcom report revive questions over how much weight past conduct and legal safeguards should carry in media deals

Can a regulator conclude that a media organization is at risk of political interference, even when there is no proof that the investor seeking to buy it has interfered in the past?

That question lies at the heart of the dispute between the media investment group IMI and the UK communications regulator Ofcom, following the publication of its report on the attempted takeover of the Telegraph Media Group by the RedBird IMI consortium.

The investment group is not only challenging the regulator's conclusion. It is also contesting the methodology of Ofcom used to assess the risks.

Past conduct and future risk

In a statement issued on 16 October 2026, IMI quoted a passage from the Ofcom report stating that it had not been necessary to rely on information about the past conduct of companies linked to the group.

The company said this amounted to a shortcoming in the assessment of a commercial organisation whose actual practices should have been taken into account. It also said the report had not established any interference on its part in the editorial policy of media outlets it had invested in.

IMI's argument rests on the importance of distinguishing between the possibility that interference could occur and evidence that it has actually taken place.

Safeguards already used in Western media

According to its statement, IMI offered permanent, legally binding undertakings to protect the Telegraph's independence. These included a commitment not to intervene in editorial decisions and the creation of an independent board of trustees with powers over the appointment and dismissal of the editor.

There are international precedents for similar arrangements. When News Corp acquired Dow Jones, the owner of the Wall Street Journal, in 2007, an independent special committee was set up to protect editorial independence. It was given rights over the appointment and removal of senior editorial staff, as well as legal powers to enforce the agreement.

Official documents from the deal show that these arrangements were not merely ethical pledges, but part of a governance agreement with legal effect.

Thomson Reuters, meanwhile, operates under its Trust Principles, which are backed by a dedicated corporate structure, the Thomson Reuters Founders Share Company, designed to protect the organisation's independence from control by any single interest.

These precedents do not mean that all proposed safeguards are equally effective. But they confirm that protecting editorial independence through legal and institutional tools is an established practice in the media industry.

A test of method

The Telegraph case raises three interconnected regulatory questions.

The first concerns how much weight an investor's past conduct should carry when assessing the likelihood of future interference. The second relates to how risks linked to ownership structures and political ties should be identified. The third concerns the standards by which legal safeguards are judged sufficient to address those risks.

IMI maintains that the Ofcom report did not give appropriate consideration to its track record or its legal commitments. Ofcom's concerns, by contrast, rest on the possibility that the newspaper's independence could be exposed to influence as a result of ties connected to the investor.

This dispute cannot be settled by suspicion or probability alone, given the clear legal safeguards IMI put forward.

The Telegraph case therefore raises a question that goes beyond a major investment deal that faltered on the basis of mere suspicion. Rather than excluding the investment, the legal safeguards offered could have been tested and, where necessary, strengthened.

If the possibility of interference becomes sufficient grounds to shut the door on an investor, despite no evidence of such interference in the past, it reopens a more sensitive question: should an investor be judged on its conduct and legal commitments, or on its nationality, country of origin and the assumptions attached to its identity?

It is precisely here that concerns about discriminatory treatment arise, along with the potential impact on international investors' confidence in the fairness of the UK's regulatory environment.