Australia And Japan Unite To Secure The Indo-Pacific

By Dr. Carlyle Thayer, Emeritus Professor of Politics at the UNSW's School of Humanities and Social Sciences

In a case of propaganda gone wrong, on the same day in June, two separate media outlets in the Solomon Islands published the exact same op-ed, verbatim. Strangely, each published the same piece under a different by-line.

Stranger still, both authors seem not to exist, and each piece conveniently regurgitates the same clunky Chinese narratives on why Pacific island states, Palau in particular, should abandon Taiwan.

This is a classic case of sock puppetry gone wrong: a smoking gun laying bare Beijing's attempts at cognitive warfare.

The propaganda disaster class is indicative of the all-encompassing, cross-domain threat China now poses. From the unsuspecting op-ed seeking to saturate search engines and influence the subconscious, to a far more blatant and aggressive military build-up, the danger posed by China now comes from all angles.

Indeed, Beijing is by most measures a military colossus, adding some 100 nuclear warheads to its arsenal each year, with defence spending nearly eight times that of Australia's.

In this respect, it is hard to disagree with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese's assessment that China, at least in its long-term plan, is seeking to disrupt regional stability and assume hegemony. Of course, Beijing rejects this notion, lamenting Albanese's 'hyped falsehoods' and insisting that its defensive might is owed to unique national characteristics.

China's behaviour suggests otherwise. The People's Liberation Army fired a ballistic missile into the Pacific just as Albanese was meeting his Fijian counterpart and Beijing continues to pursue the attainment of a blue-water navy capable of striking Australia and New Zealand.

The question for Canberra is not whether to respond to this pressure – it has little choice in the matter if it intends to help maintain security in the region. The greater debate is what form that response should take, and, crucially, with which partners.

Australia recognises that part of the answer must be diplomatic.

Over the years, Canberra has enriched its already strong relationship with Japan, underpinned by congruent strategic interests and values most notably expressed in mutual support for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).

FOIP, of which Japan was the initial architect, looks to ensure peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific by upholding the rule of law and safeguarding the region from coercion.

Both Japan and Australia have reaffirmed their enduring support for the vision. In May, Prime Ministers Takaichi and Albanese met to mark 50 years of bilateral relations between the two nations. The summit concluded with an agreement to expand cooperation in the defence, energy and critical minerals sectors, a step Tokyo had been keen to take as part of broader efforts to help realise FOIP.

Their diplomatic efforts translated into further practical success at the Shangri-La Dialogue. Following a sideline meeting of defence ministers, Japan, the United States and Australia agreed to establish TRISHIP, an information-sharing framework aimed at countering airborne and missile threats across the region.

But Australia's diplomatic outreach has reaped dividends beyond Japan. Following a meeting between Albanese and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the Joint Declaration on Defence and Security Cooperation was signed, deepening the practical partnership. Albanese has certainly been racking up the air miles, visiting Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Fiji and the Solomon Islands since January.

Diplomatic outreach is critical. It not only produces the practical agreements that bolster defence and deterrence but also demonstrates to China that the region is home to a coalition of partners unwilling to succumb to unilateral coercion.

But diplomacy alone will not give Beijing pause. The prevention of China's regional hegemony will ultimately require greater investment in individual countries' military domains.

Fortunately, key partners are stepping up in this sector too.

Canberra has committed an additional AUD $14 billion in defence spending over the next four years. Takaichi too has invested heavily in defence, with Japan's budget now exceeding AUD $79 billion (¥9 trillion) this year for the first time in the nation's history.

Takaichi has also expedited the revision of three strategic documents, and in April overhauled the country's longstanding restrictions on lethal weapons exports. The latter move will bolster the military capabilities of like-minded partners and enable deeper interoperability between them.

Canberra's response to the announcement is a case in point. Quick to capitalise, the Navy purchased 11 Mogami-class frigates from Japan. With progress on the delivery of the first vessel reportedly on track, Australia will receive a ship boasting a high degree of automation alongside advanced combat capabilities.

This investment in hard power and enriched interoperability is precisely what is required, on top of diplomatic efforts, if China's ambitions are to be held at bay.

Of course, Japan is not Australia's only partner in this effort, but the relationship offers a blueprint. As individual actors, and in concert, these are two democratic nations tackling China on the soft and hard power fronts.